I often hear people claim that everything we do is “selfish” or ultimately aimed at our own pleasure (and avoidance of pain). The way the argument usually goes is that we wouldn’t do something unless we “wanted” to do it – and that even for altruistic actions, we do them because they feel good. This view is sometimes called “psychological egoism:” the claim that every human action is motivated by self-interest. I think this claim is either seriously mistaken (if interpreted one way) or true but in a trivial and useless sense (interpreted a different way).
The claim can be quite hard to argue against because it has a certain vagueness that makes it hard to pin down what (if anything non-trivial) is really being claimed. Regardless, here are eight arguments I put together against the idea that everything we do is “selfish” or just for our own pleasure:
1. There are many actions that we take automatically and thoughtlessly due to repetition – not because of wanting or pleasure. Consider habits like brushing our teeth or sticking our phone in (for example) our left pocket (as opposed to our right one) when we’re done using it . These sorts of behaviors can be so automatic that we forget immediately afterward whether or not we’ve done these things. The point is not that these habits aren’t useful, just that at some point, we come to do them automatically without even considering whether they benefit us or not (as you may dramatically learn as you drop your phone on the ground when wearing shorts without pockets, thoughtlessly executing the “phone in pocket” habit).
Some other examples of automatic behaviors that we usually do without having any apparent desire/wanting/pleasure/pain involved: breathing, continuing to walk (once we’ve begun to walk), balancing, swallowing (once food is chewed), looking towards a sound (when there is an unusual but non-threatening noise), and social mirroring of body language.
2. Evolution didn’t select for humans based on how much they did what they “wanted” or based on who maximized their own pleasure. Rather, it selected for those whose genes spread most. Selfishness and pleasure are important tools that evolution used, but not the ONLY motivator. For instance, genuine altruism and a sense of obligation towards kin and allies can provide substantial evolutionary advantages!
3. Which pleasure are we talking about? For instance, we clearly sometimes forgo more pleasure now in exchange for extra pleasure later (e.g., by getting work done early) and other times sacrifice long-term pleasure for the short term (e.g., playing video games instead of studying when you have a big test tomorrow). So if people are just maximizing for their own pleasure, which pleasure are they maximizing for?
You might be tempted to reply, “that’s because we’re just adding up the pleasure across time to decide what to do.” But it seems clear that some people aren’t doing this (e.g., drug addicts who know their life is being ruined but sacrifice everything for the next fix). Many experiments in behavioral science and behavioral economics also contradict the idea that people are merely happiness maximizers. It’s too simple to say we “just do what gives us pleasure.”
4. “Wanting” shouldn’t be conflated with something bringing pleasure or reducing pain. They are quite correlated (since we tend to want pleasurable things), but pleasure and wanting are distinct. There are things we can really want (e.g., to “one day understand a mysterious scientific principle,” or “to keep promises” or to have certain things happen after we die) which are not about our pleasure.
Some neuroscience papers claim that “wanting” and “liking” can even be separately stimulated in rat brains. Whether scientists know how to do this or not, it seems we sometimes want things because they bring pleasure, but other times we just WANT them, so wanting and pleasure are not identical.
5. If the claim is weakened to say that we humans always do things that we have SOME sort of motivation to do, then (interpreting “motivation” broadly) the claim is trivially true. But it also doesn’t say anything – it’s right just by definition. Motivation is not identical to pleasure or wanting. So defining “wanting” to do something as having ANY motivation to do a thing doesn’t work because it renders the argument trivial. Similarly, if “self-interest” or “wanting” is just defined to be any pattern of brain activity that causes us to act, or any form of motivation at all regardless of what sort it is, then it is true (by definition) but also adds no information. What’s the point of even making the claim if it’s true by definition? In those such cases the claim can be actively misleading because “self-interest” has connotations to most people (even if you try to define those connotations away).
6. People sometimes do things that they know will bring them more pain than pleasure. For instance, a protestor who uses gasoline to set himself on fire might feel a spark of pleasure just before he lights the match, but he knows he will tremendously suffer until death. Or consider someone who takes an action for a social cause even though they know it will likely lead to spending the rest of their life in prison. Clearly, the person is sacrificing more happiness than they are gaining by such an action, yet some people do act in this way.
7. If we imagine a person who is extremely altruistic because they love making others happy, and we claim they’re “selfish” because they are doing it just to feel good, this is a very non-standard way to use the word “selfish.” It insinuates their behavior is somehow less good and is misleading in conversation. Of course, we can define words however we want, but if we define them in a way that is different than how others use a word, it makes discussion difficult and confusing.
What work does the word “selfish” do to explain things here? It’s clearer to just say (in this case) “the person is motivated by their love of helping others” and leave it at that. Most people would call that “altruism” (not “selfishness”) upon knowing all the details.
8. When we try to make the claim precise, it’s hard to do so (and, unfortunately, few I’ve encountered making the claim bother to try). We’re clearly not always maximizing long-term pleasure, but nor are we always maximizing immediate pleasure. Claiming we “always do what we want” is not the same as claiming “we always do what is pleasurable.” So maybe we just try the former claim?
If we try to restrict the claim to not be about pleasure or pain and just say, “we do what we want,” then how do we explain our numerous subconscious behaviors? And how do we define “want”? People often say they didn’t do what they “wanted,” so we can’t use colloquial definitions.
If “want” is broadened too much, then we’re back to just claiming that we do what we’re motivated to do; that is, we’re making a trivial definitional claim. So what is really being claimed by “we only ever do what we want”?
I think either nothing interesting or something false.
Now, all of this being said, clearly, people often DO act based on however they “want” to act (by a reasonable definition of “want”). And very often, people do act in such a way as to seek pleasure and avoid pain. It’s just that not all human actions fit that description, which is what the “everything is selfish” crowd claims.
To finish up, I’ll attempt to take the other side/steel-man the claim that “everything we do is something we want.” I think there is a psychological state of “desire for things to be a certain way” that drives many (though not all) of our actions. This desire for things to be a certain way is not the same as pleasure (though is often related to it) and the way we want the world to be is not always the way we think will make us happiest (though it often is). So, although I think that the generalization made by psychological egoism is false, I do think it’s approximately true, in a certain sense, a decent amount of the time.
This essay was first written on November 9, 2021, and first appeared on this site on November 12, 2021.
It’s fallacy of one cause plus motte and bailey. If you try to pin them on specifics of a selfish explanation being more predictive than other explanations they will retreat to a tautological claim that those ‘other reasons’ that are not commonly understood to be selfish have some internal representation of benefit that makes the person feel good. This refers to an unfalsifiable claim about internal states.