1. You can’t reason based on track record in the same way you can with normal predictions.
2. The stakes are extremely high. Being wrong on normal predictions rarely matters as much.

Why?

Regarding point one, reasoning based on track record:

Normally, a type of prediction being wrong again and again will lead you to dismiss that type of prediction. For instance, if every year (for some reason), experts predict that your country will soon have the highest math scores in the world, and yet each year it is ranked 50th in such scores, eventually, you (rightly) ignore the experts.

However, with extinction risks, this kind of reasoning doesn’t quite work. In all possible universes, those who predict the extinction of their species will be wrong right up until extinction happens. The predictions can, at most, be right only once.

Consider two worlds: one where humans go extinct in 2030 and one where they don’t ever go extinct (or go extinct only much later). What would you observe in 2029 regarding past predictions of extinction in these two worlds?

Well, in both worlds you’d observe that all past extinction predictions had failed up until that point. (If anything, I’d anticipate having MORE past extinction predictions fail in the world where extinction happens in 2030 since there would be more evidence of potential extinction in that world, all else equal.)

Therefore, the reasoning that “we’ve had a lot of past extinction predictions and they’ve always failed, therefore extinction is unlikely” is not a good argument – you’d witness these failed predictions in both such worlds (and perhaps even more of them in the world where extinction happens soon).

This makes predictions of extinction a special class of prediction.

To dismiss arguments about extinction risk, it’s necessary to engage with the actual arguments themselves, as they can’t be dismissed as a group due to past failed predictions. While near misses can tell you about the probability of some extinction risks (e.g., times when nuclear war nearly broke out or asteroid near impacts), failed predictions are not very informative.

Regarding point two, the enormous stakes:

Extinction, most people will agree, would be incredibly bad. For that reason, they don’t have to be very likely to be worth taking very, very seriously.

In a world where there were millions of distinct, plausible extinction risks, the large number of them would suggest that each one is (a priori) not that likely to end the species, and in such a world, it might be silly to invest much in these kinds of concerns (unless a smaller number of much more likely ones could be identified).

But that’s not the world we live in. There are only around 13 plausible human extinction risks – and in this short list, some of them aren’t even really plausible (when considered as a potential cause of literally ALL humans dying out). Here’s the list, in no particular order (if I missed any, let me know):

1. Advanced AI technology
2. Nuclear war or the invention of new destructive weapons
3. Pathogens (e.g., human-engineered viruses)
4. Asteroids, extreme solar flares, supernovae, gamma-ray bursts, or other cosmological events
5. A mega volcano, mega earthquake, dramatic change in the earth’s magnetic field, or another major geological event
6. Advanced nanotech (e.g., grey goo) or synthetic biology
7. The second coming of various figures according to different religions, or god(s) or demons ending the world or terminating our species
8. Simulators (if we’re living in a simulation) ending the world or our species
9. Aliens from other planets
10. Runaway climate change/extreme climate shifts, or sudden ecosystem collapse
11. Physics experiments (e.g., related to vacuum stability) gone wrong or that were purposely carried out to end humanity
12. Universal environmental contaminates turning out to be deadly or to cause infertility
13. Extreme population decline until no reproduction takes place (e.g., following an event that greatly reduces the world population)

Obviously, some of these are much less probable than others. And maybe you think some of these are ridiculous. Okay, cross those out. What about the others?

Given the incredible stakes, the short size of the list, and humanity’s (in my view, bizarre and irrational) unwillingness to protect its own future, all of these are worth investing much more in than humanity currently does. Obviously, it could be stupid for humanity to invest so much in preventing extinction that it’s seriously impaired. But we invest so little, it’s almost absurd.

I don’t think that predictions of extinction can be easily dismissed, despite all prior such predictions being wrong – they don’t work like other predictions do and are much higher stakes.

This piece was first written on February 13, 2025, and first appeared on my website on April 9, 2025.

So, what are those things that at least some human cultures view as INHERENTLY immoral, that is, acts they would still think of as immoral even if no other consequences of that behavior were to occur?

Here’s my attempt so far at making a comprehensive list of things that at least some cultures view as intrinsically wrong. Note that many of these items are related or overlapping. What am I missing from the list?

—

1. UNFAIRNESS

• Injustice (e.g., helping a bad person avoid punishment, or undermining someone’s just reward)

• Inequality (e.g., causing society’s resources to be concentrated among just a few while everyone else is poor, or treating people differently based on gender or skin color)

• Abuse of authority (e.g., nepotism, or favoritism, or those in power giving rewards to those they like best instead of those who deserve it, or those who are given a certain position of authority not carrying out the duties of that position, or carrying out the duties poorly or in a self-interested manner)

—

2. HARM

• Harm (e.g., causing others suffering or purposely reducing the happiness of others)

• Murder (e.g., ending the life of another person, including in some cultures, animals, or allowing others to die needlessly)

• Genocide (e.g., the harming or killing of a specific, targeted group)

• Stealing (e.g., taking something that belongs to someone else or that should be no one’s property)

• Destruction (e.g., damaging or annihilating things of value, like ruining the environment, destroying ancient or beautiful artifacts, instigating societal collapse, or hunting a species to extinction)

• Slander (e.g., speaking ill of others, or gossiping by spreading true but negative or harmful information about other people)

• Subjugation (e.g., controlling the body, mind, or choices of others, or restricting freedom)

—

3. DISRESPECT

• Disrespect of authority (e.g., being rude to your parents or disobeying your leaders)

• Disrespect of the vulnerable (e.g., treating people badly or not showing respect for members of a subjugated or vulnerable or oppressed group, or not paying proper respect to those who are victims, or disrespecting people living under hard conditions)

• Disrespect of the dead (e.g., digging up a grave, selling a dead body, necrophilia, cannibalism, speaking badly of the dead)

• Disrespect of god or gods (e.g., blasphemy, taking God’s name in vain, desecrating a place of worship, violating a commandment such as doing work on a day when work is forbidden, worshiping a carved idol instead of worshiping God, not engaging in prayer or thanks, questioning God’s nature, or God’s choices, or God’s existence)

• Practicing other faiths (e.g., worshipping alternative gods, engaging in superstitions, engaging in practices or rituals of other religions)

• Rule-breaking (e.g., violating the laws of your country or the rules of your culture, even if those laws are arbitrary or pointless)

• Violating tradition (e.g., non-conformity, or refusing to engage in the traditions of your culture, or flouting traditional roles or norms)

• Disrespect of opinions (e.g., not taking into account the opinions or desires of other people, falsely believing you know more or are wiser than others)

• Defiling (e.g., causing others to be impure, or causing others to take immoral actions, or causing others to leave your religion)

—

4. IMPURITY

• Food impurity (e.g., eating certain “forbidden”, “impure” or “disgusting” foods)

• Sexual impurity (e.g., sex before marriage, bestiality, incest, sex with forbidden people, or performing forbidden sexual acts)

• Bodily impurity (e.g., uncleanliness, or making certain disallowed alterations to the body, face, or hair, or taking drugs or intoxicants)

• Social impurity (e.g., spending time with others who are thought to be bad or impure, such as murderers or members of an outcast group)

• Unnaturalness (e.g., engaging in behaviors or social relationships that are viewed as unnatural or in violation of the natural order, or “playing god”, such as by trying to modify natural things)

—

5. DISLOYALITY

• Betrayal (e.g., refusing to help someone who has often helped you or with whom you have a long history)

• Familial rejection (e.g., disowning a family member or refusing to help a family member in need or choosing to benefit a non-family member over a family member)

• Infidelity (e.g., to cheat on a romantic partner when in a monogamous relationship)

• Treason (e.g., rejecting your in-group, or bad mouthing your in-group, or harming your in-group, or leaving your in-group for another group, running away in battle)

—

6. DISHONESTY

• Lying (e.g., being dishonest, or spreading false information, or allowing others to come to false conclusions)

• Perjury (e.g., claiming that someone did something they didn’t do in order to help yourself)

• Promise breaking (e.g., to violate a contract or go back on a promise)

• Cheating (e.g., getting an unfair advantage, violating rules that everyone else has to follow, or giving what one person has earned to a different person instead)

—

7. BAD CHARACTER

• Irresponsibility (e.g., failing to take care of your children, or do your job, or keep your promises)

• Inaction (e.g., not intervening when something bad is happening and you have the power to stop it)

• Wastefulness (e.g., letting food or resources go to waste, using more than is needed, or not making use of your talent or potential)

• Faithlessness (e.g., not believing in God or gods, not believing in the existence of good and evil, not believing that there is such a thing as moral being morality)

• Ignorance (e.g., stupidity, irrationality, lack of knowledge, narrow-mindedness, intolerance of other opinions)

• Selfishness (e.g., not caring about other people, or choosing the benefit of oneself over the benefit of one’s community, or refusing to help others who are in need when you have a lot of resources, or rejecting being part of any community, excessively promoting oneself, or bragging)

• Recklessness (e.g., allowing things of value to come into danger due to lack of forethought or caring, taking excessive risks)

• Sinful emotion (e.g., excessive anger, lust, greed, jealousy, pride, laziness, arrogance, materialistic desire)

—

EXAMPLES OF MORAL SYSTEMS

—

The Ten Commandments forbid items from 8 of these sub-categories:

• Practicing other faiths (“thou shalt have no other gods before me”)

• Disrespect of God (“thou shalt not make unto thee any graven images…not take the name of the Lord thy God in vain…remember the sabbath day”)

• Disrespect of authority (“honor thy father and thy mother”)

• Murder (“thou shalt not kill”)

• Infidelity (“thou shalt not commit adultery”)

• Stealing (“thou shalt not steal”)

• Perjury (“thou shalt not bear false witness”)

• Sinful emotion (“thou shalt not covet”)

—

The golden rule (“Do to others what you want them to do to you”) doesn’t directly forbid any of these items, but making reasonable guesses for what most people would want done to them, it likely ends up forbidding at least some items from every one of the high-level categories above.

—

The “Five Precepts” for lay followers of some traditions of Buddhism ask you to refrain from these sub-categories:

• Murder (“I undertake the training rule to abstain from killing.”)

• Stealing (“I undertake the training rule to abstain from taking what is not given.”)

• Sexual impurity (“I undertake the training rule to avoid sexual misconduct.”)

• Lying and Perjury (“I undertake the training rule to abstain from false speech.”)

• Bodily impurity (“I undertake the precept to refrain from intoxicating drinks and drugs which lead to carelessness.”)

—

As I understand it, for some (but not all) Sikhs, the main sub-categories of religious prohibitions are:

• Bodily impurity (cutting hair, taking intoxicants)

• Practicing other faiths (e.g., eating meat of animals killed in a ritualistic manner, engaging in superstitious rituals, and animal sacrifice)

• Sinful emotion (obsessive greed/materialistic desire)

• Selfishness (living a life disconnected from society as a recluse or non-family oriented living, bragging)

• Slander

• Lying

• Infidelity

This piece was first written on April 18, 2018, and first appeared on my website on September 15, 2025.

Here are 24 different methods you could use to better understand the way humans work. In each case, I use “trying to figure out new things about post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD)” as an example. What techniques am I leaving out here?

1. Papers: Reading academic studies (e.g., from social psychology, consumer psychology, cognitive psychology, neuroscience, etc.)

Example: reading the newest academic papers on treatments for PTSD.

2. Products: Carefully examining products and apps that have been successful (as well as, potentially, those that have failed) to understand what human needs they were or weren’t satisfying and why they succeeded or failed.

Example: looking at what mental health apps related to PTSD are popular in the app stores.

3. Outliers: Investigating extreme case studies of real-life events (e.g., case studies of people with extreme psychological conditions who may have been reported about in the news or true stories about what actually happened when people were placed into really extreme conditions).

Example: reading about cases of extreme cults and whether or not each cult produced PTSD-like symptoms in its members.

4. Society: Examining the large-scale trends and organization of societies, including potentially human cultures around the world (American culture, traditional cultures, etc.) and how they are similar or different, and which societal structures tend to be created and what the effects of these structures are, etc.

Example: investigating which sort of societies PTSD appears to be much more prevalent in.

5. Conversations: Talking to smart and insightful people about what they think is true of human psychology. You can also show them the models or theories you have so far to get their criticism and suggestions for improving them.

Example: asking really smart (non-experts) who had PTSD what their current theories about PTSD are.

6. Reading: Reading books, blog posts, media articles, etc., containing information from smart or insightful people about psychology (including potentially writing from life coaches, relationship experts, marketers, thoughtful bloggers, user experience designers, game makers, etc.)

Example: seeing what theories bloggers have proposed regarding PTSD that many academics may not have considered.

7. Experts: Reaching out to experts and talking to them to understand their models of psychology (e.g., psychologists, psychiatrists, game developers, etc.). You can also show them the models and theories you have so far to get their criticism and suggestions for improving them.

Example: talking to world-class experts in PTSD.

8. Textbooks: Reading academic textbooks about psychology, cognitive science, etc.

Example: Linehan’s textbook on DBT and thinking about possible applications of DBT in PTSD treatment.

9. Models: Looking at what models or frameworks of psychology others have created (e.g., in social psychology, theoretical cognitive neuroscience, gamification research, persuasion research, etc).

Example: looking at the model of PTSD that is used in Cognitive Behavioral Therapy treatment.

10. Intuition: Our own intuition for what’s true about humans (presumably based on our first-hand experience interacting with others, as well as our first-hand, ingrained experience of just being a human).

Example: We may have the intuition that after experiencing a traumatic event, people will tend to start having frequent disruptive thoughts about that event, even when doing unrelated things.

11. Interviews: talking to individuals or groups about their thought processes, feelings, behaviors, etc., to understand their individual psychology and then attempting to extrapolate that knowledge to humans more generally.

Example: interviewing 20 people with PTSD about what their experience of it is like and what does or does not seem to help them.

12. Application: attempting to put into practice a psychological theory (e.g., by coaching individuals using a psychological technique or by trying to build an app that implements it) and paying attention to the ways it seems to work or not work.

Example: creating a tool for people with PTSD and making it publicly available, then monitoring how people respond to it.

13. Anecdotes: psychologically surprising or interesting anecdotes that we’re confident actually happened (e.g., because they happened to us or were reported on by a trustworthy source) that may have a bearing on human psychology.

Example: a story a friend told you about how they (believe) they fully cured their own extreme PTSD in a matter of days.

14. Self-observation: careful (and honest) observation of our own thoughts/beliefs/behavior/emotions and internal processes.

Example: observing the mental processes in your own mind that seem to occur after a very upsetting event has happened.

15. Self-experimentation: simply trying techniques and paying close attention to what effects they appear to have and what it feels like to apply them.

Example: try the technique of writing down for a week every upsetting thought that you notice yourself having, as well as writing down everything you observe or learn about the experience of doing this.

16. Deduction: combining propositions we already believe to produce new propositions we didn’t realize before that may be true.

Example: knowing that women with PTSD are much more likely to have associated depression than men with PTSD, and knowing that depression is a strong risk factor for attempting suicide, we might predict that women with PTSD are more likely to attempt suicide than men with PTSD (even though they may not be more likely than men to actually commit suicide).

17. Experiments: Conduct your own online randomized controlled trials, surveys, longitudinal studies, or fMRI studies, etc.

Example: looking at which variables that don’t seem obviously PTSD related are, in fact, strong predictors of whether someone has PTSD.

18. Statistics: looking up known statistics about a phenomenon.

Example: looking up whether younger people or older people are known to be more likely to get PTSD in any given 12-month period.

19. Data: finding existing data sets (e.g., large longitudinal surveys or government data sets) and running your own statistical analyses to test hypotheses.

Example: measuring whether it is true that after someone gets a pet, they are more likely to recover from PTSD than similar people who do not get a pet. Running studies can also be a good way to search for new hypotheses. For instance, examining which of many variables in the data are most associated with a rapid recovery from PTSD.

20. Literature: looking at portrayals of psychology in literature, art, myths, stories, philosophical writings, etc.

Example: What hypotheses do Kafka’s novels give us about the nature of trauma?

21. Crowdsourcing: Request suggestions for hypotheses on a social media platform like Facebook or X or on a question-answer site like Quora.

Example: posting to Facebook asking people to suggest theories for why PTSD sometimes does and sometimes doesn’t happen after extreme trauma.

22. Social experiments: bringing a group of people together under a new set of chosen social rules or guidelines and observing what happens.

Example: getting a small group of people together with the idea that it will be a time to discuss traumas that members of the group have experienced.

23. Evolution: considering what possible evolutionary function different psychological phenomena might have.

Example: consider ways that aspects of PTSD responses might be evolutionarily adaptive.

24. Practitioners: examine how people “in the field” who benefit from being able to understand this aspect of psychology do their work.

For example, at veterans hospitals where rates of PTSD are high, investigate what techniques and approaches the therapists have developed to work successfully with their patients.

This piece was first written on November 16, 2017, and first appeared on my website on July 22, 2025.

(1) Human groups have pretty much always done unspeakably horrible things to other groups (e.g., think mass murder and numerous forms of oppression). And fairly often, while it is happening, this evil seems to be condoned, supported, or only passively opposed by a large and fairly culturally representative group, rather than by just a few very bad people.

Are we humans evil?

(2) On the other hand, the vast majority of people feel sympathetic when they see people suffering (even realistic depictions of suffering in movies), and are willing to help people they don’t know at some inconvenience to themselves in the right circumstances. For instance, if an elderly stranger passes out in an office building elevator when only one other person is there, most likely that other person would try to help, even if it caused them to be late to work. In other words, the vast majority of people are at least moderately pro-social, have some compassion for strangers, and will at least sometimes inconvenience themselves to help others when they don’t expect to gain anything out of it.

Are we humans good?

Originally I attempted to explain these phenomena using the idea of “mimicry” that people just copy what others do, so if people are harming others, people will copy and do it too, but I no longer think that really gets at the core of the issue (though I do think mimicry plays a certain role, as you’ll see).

Below is my attempt to reach a simplified explanation for the seeming contradiction between (1) and (2). This theory is by no means novel. If there is anything novel about it, it’s in the particular way of combining the various pieces, or trying to fill out certain details.

So what’s going on with our species?

We humans seem to automatically divide others into “moral groups.” In our minds, each of these moral groups has an implicit “moral weight.” A group’s moral weight determines:

• whether you think the fates of members of that group are important (high moral weight) or irrelevant (low moral weight)
• whether you see it as good to help a member of that group (high moral weight) or acceptable to harm a member of that group (low moral weight)

If harming a certain group (call it “group X”) is considered both acceptable AND happens to be useful, convenient, or a way to reduce perceived danger, then murder or subjugation of group X may ensue with little guilt. In other words, if one group assigns group X a low moral weight, and there is some additional reason why harming group X seems useful, then that harm may well occur.

The simplest example of this is the way we kill insects regularly without a second thought. But the distinction of being assigned very low moral weight is not just reserved for insects. We humans unfortunately sometimes do it to other human groups.

Some small percentage of people in our society view killing insects as morally unacceptable. Similarly, in societies where the majority generally assigns essentially no moral weight to group X and plans to massacre or oppress group X, there will usually be a minority of conscientious objectors who protest it. According to this model, this occurs because (for various reasons) this minority assigns a different moral weight to group X than the majority.

Here are some examples of common groups people might assign different moral weights to:

• “family member”
• “friend”
• “child (my own)”
• “child (not my own)”
• “person I am interacting with right now”
• “neighbor”
• “citizen of my country”
• “person I’ve met before but don’t really know”
• “person of my religion”
• “criminal”
• “white person”
• “black person”
• “murderer”
• “celebrity”
• “French person”
• “friend of a friend”
• “co-worker”
• “foreigner from somewhere unfamiliar”
• “human being”
• “cow”

People can fall into different groups, each group having varying moral weights, making it more complex than an in-group/out-group binary. If someone falls into multiple groups, then the moral weight assigned to that person is some complex combination of the moral weights of the different groups they belong to. In some cases, it seems to be the maximal moral weight of any group they belong to (e.g., a parent would usually be treated as being in the parent group regardless of what other groups they fall into), but sometimes we focus on the lowest moral weights (e.g., a work colleague who was also a murderer may end up getting a moral weight closer to that of a murderer than of any other work colleague).

I’ve identified six factors that seem to be predictive of how much moral weight a person assigns to a given group. Moral weight seems to be higher for:

1. Relation: groups that share a person’s genetics (e.g., “parent”). This has an obvious evolutionary explanation as a gene propagation mechanism. Many people feel we have the strongest moral obligations to our family members.

2. Enjoyment: groups that we enjoy interacting with (e.g., “friends” or “puppies”). For instance, people are more comfortable screwing over a person they dislike than a person they like.

3. Familiarity: groups we are highly familiar with or spend a lot of time with (e.g., “work colleagues”). Almost everyone would save a long time acquaintance over a stranger they’ve just met if forced to make a choice.

4. Similarity: groups we perceive as similar to ourselves or that we group ourselves with (e.g. “people of our own country” or “people of our own religion”). People feel a heightened duty to protect others from their country, religion, etc.

5. Safety: groups we are not afraid of or view as non-threatening (e.g., this would exclude “sharks” and “violent criminals”). People often feel justified in harming someone in “self-defense.”

6. Innocence: groups we feel are innocent rather than capable of being sinful or responsible for their actions (e.g., “children”). There is something that people find particularly repugnant about harming children, or anyone helpless.

As mentioned before, a classic example of a group who the majority view as having near-zero moral weight is “insect.” Insects (1) hardly share any genetics in common with us, (2) we don’t like interacting with them, (3) we don’t generally spend much time with them (at least, not on purpose), (4) we don’t perceive them as similar to ourselves, and (5) we often view them as a threat. The only thing they have going for them is that we may or may not view them as innocent, but I suspect a lot of people view them as guilty because sometimes they seem to be intentionally bothering us.

Chickens do slightly better than insects on these criteria. Those who interact with them tend to enjoy it a lot more than interacting with insects, and they seem more similar to us than insects, but mostly we treat them as having low moral weight as well (which helps explain why it’s so common to eat them).

To give a few more examples:

• Cats (in the U.S., anyway) do much better on the criteria 2-6 than chickens, so we assign them much higher moral weight than chickens.
• People of our own country do much better on criteria 2-4 than people of other countries.
• Family members usually do much better on criteria 1-5 than people of our own country.
• Violent criminals typically don’t do well on criteria 1-6, and, empirically, people often seem willing to strip rights away from this group, and in some cases, have them executed.

Circling back to our original question with this model in mind, how do we rectify the seeming contradiction that:

(1) most people are pro-social

(2) human groups do unspeakably horrible things to other groups

According to this model, the answer is simple. When one group assigns almost no moral weight to another group, they are willing to do horrible things to do that group. To them, it is simply not morally problematic, because that’s what moral weight MEANS. However, when that group has a reasonable amount of moral weight assigned (e.g. “person who works in my office building”), they are happy to be helpful and generally act pro-socially. A small percentage of people are truly sociopathy, and assign low moral weight to everyone. But the far more common thing is to assign high moral weight to some groups, and low moral weight to others (influenced by factors 1-6 above).

So, instead of: “are we humans fundamentally good, or not?”, the question becomes: “who are we good to?”

Now, this doesn’t mean that a group WANTS to destroy all groups they assign a low moral weight to. You may assign low moral weight to insects, but that doesn’t mean you spend your weekends trying to find insects to harm. All that low moral weight means is that you are WILLING to do harm if it happens to be advantageous. If an incentive to destroy or control the group is added (e.g., the group is viewed as threatening or useful), then the mass murder or mass oppression may begin.

If this simple theory is reasonably accurate, then it suggests that most of the greatest evils of humanity are not the evils of individual bad actors, but the evil of assigning little moral weight to other groups, combined with the view that it would be “useful” to harm that low moral weight group.

When these groups are across borders, we get war and mass murder. When these groups are ethnic, it can lead to genocide. When these groups are across gender, it can lead to the mass oppression of women or the murder of female babies. When these groups are across species, we get large scale mistreatment of animals in factory farms.

But where do these assignments of moral weight come from? Here are some possible factors:

(i) Mimicry: to a significant extent, we copy the moral weights that we are implicitly taught by the people around us, especially when we’re growing up. So if, as a child, we see that our family members don’t assign any moral weight to group X, we learn not to assign a moral weight to group X as well. This is, I think, where mimicry does come into play.

(ii) Bad actors: sometimes, individual bad actors that are influential in a group, call it group “A,” convince others in group A to assign less moral weight to another group X. This may be for their own selfish reasons, or because they themselves assign a low moral weight to X and want others to as well. The bad actor may cause group A to assign a less moral weight to X by appealing to factor (D), the idea that group X is very different than group A, such as by highlighting differences between A and X or causing group X to stand out even more. Another option is for the bad actor to try to leverage (E), the idea that group X is harmful or dangerous. They may also do this by taking advantage of factor (F), the idea that group X is not innocent, for example, by blaming something that happened a long time ago on that group, even if it poses no threat today.

(iii) Danger: stability and safety in our society seem to influence the assignment of moral weights. It seems that, on average, the less we can trust those around us, and the more we have to fear danger, the more narrowly we define which groups have a high moral weight, and the more we rely on factors A-F to decide who matters. For instance, if you are trying to survive during wartime and barely have enough to eat, you may be more likely to only assign a substantial moral weight to your closest family members, whereas as danger lessens, you may start increasing the moral weight that you assign to neighbors.

(iv) Genetics: It’s also possible that genetic differences exist as well in how we assign moral weights to others, since there is at least some genetic variation in quite a number of traits. For instance, it could be that some people are just born more compassion than others, and are therefore more prone to assign higher moral weights to more groups than others are, all else being equal.

There have been a number of attempts to cause people to more broadly assign higher moral weight, such as in certain Buddhist traditions, the Effective Altruism movement, and, perhaps, the Hippie movement. One common theme of such movements is an unusually large amount of vegetarianism and veganism since, as the expanding “moral circle” (as its sometimes called) begs the question of whether other species should be included.

Creating widespread change in the assignment of moral weight seems as valuable as it is challenging, it strikes me as an extremely valuable project. If the simplified model suggested above is at least modestly accurate, then, causing a more broad and uniform assignment of moral weight could go a long way toward preventing future evils that we humans tend to inflict on each other. What’s more, when we assign reasonably high moral weight to a group we do more than prevent harm: we tend to actively help it, even where personal benefit is unlikely.

So why do we behave in these strange ways? Well, here’s my list of reasons we so often fail to act in our own self-interest. As you can see, the reasons are numerous.

Note: the items listed are neither mutually exclusive nor collectively exhaustive. Some reasons are connected, and sometimes multiple reasons apply in the same scenario.

(1) Misinformation – believing an action is in your self-interest when it isn’t, or that an action isn’t in your self-interest when it is (e.g., taking useless nutritional supplements daily, because you’ve heard they are helpful but are unaware of the significant risk they pose to your liver)

(2) Temptation – choosing a tempting, short-term benefit over a larger long-term benefit (e.g., eating the chocolate cake that you know you’ll regret tomorrow)

(3) Avoidance – avoiding a certain choice based on its short-term consequences, even though it could be better for you long-term (e.g., staying in an unhealthy relationship to avoid a painful breakup)

(4) Anxiety – avoiding a beneficial action out of fear of possible consequences (e.g., avoiding public speaking opportunities because they cause anxiety despite enjoying public speaking overall) [This is similar to Avoidance, but different because Avoidance is based on a real consequence, as opposed to irrational fear.]

(5) Altruism – acting in a way that is beneficial to a person or cause but harmful to you in some way (e.g., donating a substantial portion of your income to an effective charity) [this is a positive reason but included for comprehensiveness] 

(6) Forgetting – simply not remembering to act on something that is beneficial (e.g., forgetting to take your medicine)

(7) Confusion – not knowing how to carry out a beneficial action properly (e.g., you want to lift weights weekly to be healthier, but do not have sufficient training on the correct form to avoid injury)

(8) Distraction – intending to carry out a beneficial action but getting sidetracked during the process (e.g., sitting down at 6 pm for daily journaling but being called away to help your child)

(9) Delaying – pushing a beneficial action into the future since it has no clear deadline (e.g., you know you really should get treatment for your sleep problems that are ruining your happiness, but you’re busy and plan to address it next month)

(10) Helplessness – you’re convinced that attempts to take a beneficial action will inevitably fail, so lack the motivation to try (e.g., you feel that you’re dumb and will get bad grades no matter what, so you feel unmotivated to try in school)

(11) Unmotivated – knowing a certain action is good for you, in theory, but not feeling driven to do it (e.g., you know your current job is not a good fit for you but never feel motivated to search for a different one)

(12) Habits – you fall into harmful, subconsciously triggered routines of behavior or perpetually behave in a way that inhibits beneficial outcomes (e.g., you have a habit of fixating on negative traits of other people, and this makes it hard to develop deep friendships)

(13) Unequipped – you lack the ability or resources to carry out a beneficial action due to a lack of practice or training (e.g., you know it’s important to communicate honestly with your romantic partner, but struggle to put your thoughts and challenges into words)

(14) Love – making a sacrifice for a person with whom you have a close personal relationship (e.g., a parent who works an extra job so as to send their child to a better school they couldn’t otherwise afford) [similar to altruism, but more personal than acting out of general goodwill]

(15) Punishment – you punish yourself because you feel you deserve it, or to harm others indirectly (e.g., a teenager who engages in self-harm because they believe they are worthless or because they know it upsets their parents)

(16) Overwhelm – you have too many choices or too much information related to a certain action, so you shutdown or stick with the first or easiest choice (e.g., you know you should carefully select details of your 401(k) plan but, after reviewing three dozen options, you get frustrated and leave it at the default setting)

(17) Reactance – you resist outside efforts to control you (e.g., an employee who intentionally takes three cups of coffee per day in order to flout the two cup limit)

(18) Freedom – you choose to act contrary to your self-interest solely to demonstrate (to yourself or others) your freedom to choose (e.g., a person who makes a minor bad decision to show they could do so any time, if desired)

(19) Impulse – you feel a strong, subconscious-rooted urge to carry out certain harmful actions (e.g., a person who feels a strong urge to curse constantly)

(20) Expectations – you are expected to or pressured to act a certain way, and you are either used to satisfying expectations or desire social acceptance (e.g., an unbelieving person attends weekly religious services long-term solely because the community views them as devout) 

(21) Over-optimizing – you expend so much time, attention, or effort toward improving on a process or decision that you end up losing more than you gained (e.g., someone who changes projects every year because they want to find the very “best” project but actually accomplishes little because the projects are all left unfinished)

(22) Fatigue – you do not have the cognitive resources to make a good judgment at that moment [resulting from lack of sleep, burnout, drugs, etc.]

(23) Misjudgment – you misjudge the relevant probabilities or values involved in a choice and so choose the wrong one (e.g., making a bad stock market investment because of misanalysis of the relevant factors) 

(24) Uncertainty – you avoid options that are uncertain or ambiguous because certainty makes you more comfortable (e.g., someone who passes on a new interactive theatre experience, something they have no previous experience with, to instead watch a movie they’ve seen fifteen times)

(25) Inertia – you stick to the decision you previously made, or the path you’re already going down, even though it is clearly no longer beneficial (e.g., you’ve finished the first year of law school and, even though you don’t like it or want to be a lawyer anymore, you don’t withdraw) 

(26) Haste – you make a decision under time pressure and therefore don’t consider all the options or don’t consider the options thoroughly enough (e.g., a deer runs into the road, and you decide to swerve left even though it would have been a lot safer to swerve right)

(27) Prioritization – you expend effort or resources to make good decisions in some areas but not in those that are less important to you (e.g., a person chooses to focus their entire energy on getting healthy but neglects interpersonal relationships)

(28) Morality – you think it would be immoral to take the action that is most in your self-interest, or you feel guilty thinking about taking it (e.g., you really want a stereo and know you wouldn’t be caught stealing it, but you won’t take it anyway) 

(29) Emotion – you are experiencing intense emotions that alter your perception of what a good decision would be (e.g., you are really pissed off, so you punch the person that you’re talking to)

(30) Complexity – the decision is too complex for you to reason about effectively or too different from previous decisions you’ve made for your intuition to be reliable (e.g., you’ve just been elected president, and now you have to make decisions involving hundreds of factors and hard to predict second-order effects in areas that you’re not an expert in)

(31) Identity – you think of yourself as the sort of person who does X, so you choose to do X to maintain this self-identity or as a shortcut in decision-making (e.g., a person who thinks of themselves as a non-drinker and so doesn’t even consider the option of drinking in cases where they could potentially benefit)

(32) Attention – you make self-harming decisions because you want others to notice you, step in to help you or show that they care (e.g., a person who burns themselves with cigarettes so that others will notice the burns and feel concerned)

(33) Myopia – you think that your options are more limited than they are or you fail to fully consider what your best option is (e.g., you quit your job because you think of your options as either “stay” or “quit,” whereas you would have actually been better off renegotiating your role without quitting)

(34) Normality – you don’t want to take any action that may be considered strange, odd or weird (e.g., even though you are confident you would be better off having an open relationship rather than a monogamous one, you would not consider it because in your culture that would be a “strange” lifestyle)